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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 WELLINGTON 000739

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STATE FOR CA A/S HARTY, CA/VO/BIP (NEGAH ANGHA), INR/IC
(TSC DEPUTY DIRECTOR JOSIE PANEDICK), EAP/FO, AND EAP/ANP
NCTC/TIG FOR DAVID WIGMORE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2015

TAGS: [CVIS](#) [PTER](#) [PINR](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [NZ](#)

SUBJECT: NZ FOLLOW-UP: HSPD-6 TERRORIST LOOKOUT INFORMATION
SHARING INITIATIVE

REF: A. SECSTATE 173539

[1](#)B. STATE 158827

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires David R. Burnett,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (S) Post IWG agencies met to discuss Ref A and B. We also discussed the possibility of the terrorist lookout information sharing pilot with Conoff in Auckland. Agencies all agree that GNZ would be a good candidate for the proposed pilot project, and would likely be receptive should we make this request. If Washington decides to pursue this project, we recommend that, as a first step, Post raise the issue with Mary Anne Thompson, Deputy Secretary at the Department of Labour. Thompson is currently charged with overseeing much of NZ's immigration policy, including counter-terrorism measures. She is an invaluable behind-the-scenes Embassy contact. Thompson has worked as a staffer for two Prime Ministers and has in the past provided us with valuable insights about how best to sell U.S. policies within GNZ. She is also generally sympathetic with USG counter-terrorism policies in the region.

[1](#)2. (S) Agencies also reviewed the questions provided Ref B, and offer the following preliminary answers. We should be able to provide more detailed information if and when we are instructed to approach GNZ on this issue:

[1](#)A. (SBU) What, if any, arrangements already exist for the systematic sharing of terrorist lookout information with GNZ?

-- (S) Post Liaison officers, PE, and DCM all regularly share information with GNZ at Washington's request. GNZ regularly, and informally, shares information with CONS in Auckland at the working level. NSA and GCSB (NZ's NSA equivalent) also regularly share information. With the exception of NSA/GCSB exchanges, which are automated, all post/GNZ information is exchanged through person-to-person contacts.

B) Does the GNZ currently maintain unclassified lookout information on individuals based on terrorist-related information? Does the GNZ maintain classified or restricted lookout information on individuals based on terrorist-related information?

-- (S) Airlines maintain unclassified passenger lists. Customs maintains an unclassified database for use by Immigration's border control agents. The data includes tips for identification, and may also advise agents to contact authorities if a person in the data base is positively identified. Customs also maintains classified data bases.

C) If the answer to either or both question is yes, how is this information maintained? Is it consolidated in one database or are there multiple databases with this information? Are these databases automated?

-- (S) As noted above, there are separate databases, all of which are automated. The unclassified Customs/Immigration databases include unclassified instructions based on information contained in the classified Customs database. Many of the "tips" for identification included in the unclassified databases are based on information that post

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liaisons have provided to GNZ via the NZ Security Services (NZSIS). GNZ agencies are currently trying to improve their internal data sharing. Our Consular Section Chief notes that the data GNZ has provided the Consulate is usually of high quality and seems readily retrievable.

D) Which biographic elements are included in the GNZ's terrorist-related lookout system(s) (examples: name, date of birth, citizenship, passport number, mother's maiden name). Are biometrics, specifically fingerprints, associated with the lookout system(s)?

-- (S) All the referenced data points are included in GNZ's classified databases, assuming the agencies have that

information. Most information is included in the unclassified databases as well. The classified databases

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also include individual's distinguishing marks. Although police have some biometrics (fingerprints) in their database, to our knowledge these are not included in the lookout system databases.

E) Which biographic and/or biometric elements on an individual are considered mandatory for the GNZ to use that information in the country's terrorist-related lookout system(s)? What are the definitions and evidentiary standards used by the GNZ to determine whether an individual gets placed on the terrorist-related lookout system?

-- (S) Post is not familiar with GNZ procedures in this area. F) With the GNZ under which department or entities are the terrorist-related lookout systems maintained? What are the internal sharing arrangements? Does the host-country share terrorist information with other countries, i.e. Brunei and Singapore?

-- (S) See above for information regarding which agencies maintain lookout systems, as well as internal sharing systems. From time to time, GNZ officials have told us that they are sharing terrorist information with other countries, but we are not familiar with any formal mechanisms that may be in place to facilitate such exchanges.

G) How does the GNZ use terrorist-related lookout information in screening processes? For the screening of visa applicants? For screening at ports of entry? For internal law enforcement purposes? For any other screening purposes?

-- (S) GNZ uses its terrorist-related lookout information to screen visa applicants and applicants at the port of entry. Recently, GNZ missions abroad made a couple of high-profile immigration errors concerning former members of Saddam's regime. As a result, GNZ is in the process of changing its visa-processing system so that all visa decisions involving countries of concern will be adjudicated by GNZ officials in Wellington. (SBU) During the recent election campaign, GNZ officials said that 63 individuals had been barred entry into New Zealand over the past two years because they had been positively identified in GNZ lookout systems as security risks.

H) Which legal authorities guide the GNZ's use of terrorist-related lookout information?

-- (S) The Counter-terrorism Act of 2002, as amended, is the primary legislation guiding GNZ's counter-terrorism lookout data bases and related policies.

I) How do any of the GNZ's privacy laws or their equivalent influence the use of terrorist-related information?

-- (S) GNZ's counter-terrorism provisions have been criticized by some, including the Green Party, as being an infringement of privacy. However, the Attorney General sent a report to Parliament in 2002 that said nothing in New Zealand's primary Counter-terrorism legislation (The Counter-terrorism Bill 2002) appeared inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.

J) Does the GNZ have legal authorities or instruments to make terrorist-related lookout information accessible to other countries? Are there impediments that could inhibit making this terrorist-related information accessible to other countries? Does the GNZ have an equivalent entity to the Terrorist Screening Center?

-- (S) Given our intelligence-sharing relationship with New Zealand, we are not aware of any impediments to GNZ's sharing with us of any terrorist-related lookout information. As we have noted, such exchanges already take place. We are not familiar with NZ policies concerning exchanges with other countries. There is no GNZ equivalent to the Terrorist Screening Center, although as we noted above GNZ is making an effort to improve screening coordination among its various agencies.
Burnett